新SAT写作考试阅读精选材料推荐六(文化话题)

北京sat培训,sat备考资料,sat网课,sat培训机构,sat保分班,sat真题

本文为大家推荐的是来源于《纽约客》的一篇文章——What do the Brexit Movement ande Donald Trump have

in common?作者是 John Cassidy .

文章内容：

things go as expected on Thursday, British voters will reject the option

ofleaving the European Union. Likewise, if things go as expected come November,

American voters will reject the option of electing a President Trump. Both

outcomes would be reassuring, but they wouldn’t mean the end of right-wing

populism on either side of the Atlantic—they may merely represent new high-water

marks.

When the Brexit referendum is done, tens of millions of Britons will likely

have registered a vote against the liberal vision of European unity and

assimilation. In this country, even after the disastrous past few weeks Donald

Trump has had, anew opinion poll, from Quinnipiac University, indicates that in

crucial states like Ohio and Pennsylvania he remains statistically tied with

Hillary Clinton.

Why is this happening? Trump and his counterpart in Britain, the U.K.

Independence Party (ukip) leader Nigel Farage, didn’t emerge from nowhere. Both

are wealthy men who affect an affinity with the common people, and who have

skillfully exploited a deep well of resentment among working-class and

middle-class voters, some of whom have traditionally supported left-of-center

parties. Certainly, a parallel factor in both men’s rise is racism, or, more

specifically, nativism. Trump has presented a nightmarish vision of America

overrun by Mexican felons and Muslim terrorists. ukip printed up campaign

posters that showed thousands of dark-colored refugees lining up to enter

Slovenia, which is part of the E.U., next to the words “breaking point: The EU

has failed us all.” But racism and nationalism have both been around for a long

time, as have demagogues who try to exploit them. In healthy democracies, these

troublemakers are confined to the fringes.

Historically, transforming radical parties of the right (or left) into mass

movements has required some sort of disaster, such as a major war or an economic

depression. Europe in the early twentieth century witnessed both, with

cataclysmic results. After the First World War, the introduction of social

democracy, the socioeconomic system that most Western countries settled on,

delivered steadily rising living standards, which helped to keep the extremists

at bay. If prosperity wasn’t shared equally—and it wasn’t—egalitarian social

norms and redistributive tax systems blunted some of the inequities that go

along with free-market capitalism.

But in the past few decades Western countries have been subjected to a

triad of forces that, while not as visible or dramatic as wars and depressions,

have proved equally destabilizing: globalization, technical progress, and a

political philosophy that embraces both. In the United States, it is no

coincidence that Trump is doing well in the Rust Belt and other deindustrialized

areas. A one-two punch of automation and offshoring has battered these regions,

leaving many of their residents ill-equipped to prosper in today’s economy.

Trump is exploiting the same economic anxieties and resentments that helped

Bernie Sanders, another critic of globalization and free trade, carry the

Michigan Democratic primary.

“There is no excuse for supporting a racist, sexist, xenophobic buffoon

like Donald Trump,” Dean Baker, an economist and blogger at the liberal Center

for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, noted recently. “But we should

be clear; the workers who turn to him do have real grievances. The system has

been rigged against them.”

Similarly, it is not an accident that ukip is popular in the former mill

towns of northern England, in the engineering belt of the West Midlands, and in

working-class exurbs of London. “Children emerging from the primary school next

door, almost all from ethnic minorities, are just a visible reminder for anyone

seeking easy answers to genuine grievance,” the Guardian’s Polly Toynbee wrote,

last week, after a visit to Barking, in Essex, which is close to a big car

factory owned by Ford. “As high-status Ford jobs are swapped for low-paid

warehouse work, indignation is diverted daily against migrants by the Mail, Sun,

Sunday Times and the rest. . . . This is the sound of Britain breaking.”

For the past half century, the major political parties, on both sides of

the Atlantic, have promulgated the idea that free trade and globalization are

the keys to prosperity. If you pressed the mainstream economists who advise

these parties, they might concede that trade creates losers as well as winners,

and that the argument for ever more global integration implicitly assumes that

the winners will compensate the losers. But the fact that such a sharing of the

gains has been sorely lacking was regarded as a relatively minor detail, and

certainly not as a justification for calling a halt to the entire process.

If you are reading this post, the likelihood is that you, like me, are one

of the winners. Highly educated, professional people tend to work in sectors of

the economy that have benefitted from the changes in the international division

of labor (e.g., finance, consulting, media, tech) or have been largely spared

the rigors of global competition (e.g., law, medicine, academia). From a secure

perch on the economic ladder, it is easy to celebrate the gains that technology

and globalization have brought, such as a cornucopia of cheap goods in rich

countries and rising prosperity in poor ones. It’s also tempting to dismiss the

arguments of people who ignore the benefits of this process, or who can’t see

that it is irreversible.

But, as Baker points out, “it is a bit hypocritical of those who have

benefited” from this economic transformation to be “mocking the poor judgment of

its victims”—especially now that the forces of global competition and

technological progress are reaching into areas that were previously protected.

In a world of self-driving cars and trucks, what is the future for truck

drivers, cab and limo drivers, and delivery men? Not a very prosperous one,

surely. And the creative destruction that the Austrian economist Joseph

Schumpeter celebrated won’t stop there. With software that can transfer money at

zero cost, medical robots that can carry out the most delicate of operations,

and smart algorithms that can diagnose diseases or dispense legal advice, what

is the future for bankers, surgeons, doctors, lawyers, and other

professionals?

There is no straightforward answer to this question, just as there is no

easy answer to the question of what can be done to help those who have already

lost out. One option is to strengthen the social safety net and, perhaps, to

move toward some sort of universal basic income, which would guarantee a minimum

standard of living to everybody, regardless of employment prospects. The

political enactment of such solutions, however, is contingent on the existence

of social solidarity, which the very process of economic and technological

change, by heightening inequalities and eroding communal institutions,

undermines.

Lacking grounds for optimism, and feeling remote from the levers of power,

the disappointed nurse their grievances—until along come politicians who tell

them that they are right to be angry, that their resentments are justified, and

that they should be mad not just at the winners but at immigrants, too. Trump

and Farage are the latest and most successful of these political opportunists.

Sadly, they are unlikely to be the last.

小伙伴们可以先练习阅读文章，归纳文章的论点和中心思想以及文章中作者使用的分析论技巧，最后就是尝试着写作。

传送门

新SAT阅读6大考试技巧：http://sat.yibohua.con/yuedu47329.html

可汗学院新SAT考试练习题资料下载：http://sat.yibohua.con/satziliao47730.html

新SAT阅读考试官方OG题型解析汇总：http://sat.yibohua.con/yuedu47372.html